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What Makes Arab Economies Fail?
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Socioeconomic Reforms and Institutions

Islam ABDELBARY1 and James BENHIN 2
(Working Paper presented at the 16th Annual International Conference of Middle East
Economic Association 2017, and TED University Trade Research Center in Ankara,
Turkey, May 18-20, 2017)

Abstract
Following the Arab spring, Arabs today are passing through a dangerous time of tough and
difficult choices that bear far-reaching consequences. This paper argues that there was a
significant economic element to the Arab Spring, which relies mainly on the Arab economies’
failure to achieve sustained inclusive growth. The purpose of the study is to understand whether
the economic growth of the region has been unsatisfactory due to Arab economies lagging in
terms of reforms, or because of the reform programs themselves.
In this paper, the empirical model analyses the linkages between economic reforms, human
capital, physical infrastructure, and governance and growth for a panel of 87 countries,
including 20 from the Arab region over the period 1995 to 2014. The analysis finds that
macroeconomic and external stability are primary variables for the reform development and
the growth prospects of the developing countries. The efficiency of structural reforms depends
on success in stabilising the economy. The most striking result from the baseline model is that
the coefficient of governance is significant and positively determines growth in the whole
sample, while it is harmful in Arab sample. Additionally, the result tends to show that the
resource curse in the Arab region is largely an “institutional curse”, even though it has several
macroeconomic manifestations.
The conclusion of the study confirms that reform is simultaneously political, social and
economic. Economic reform should not be seen in a vacuum, in isolation from the political and
social choices that society makes.
Keywords: economic reform, Arab Spring, governance, panel analysis, North Africa
and the Middle East
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1. Background
Arab countries (ACs) are a diverse set regarding size, geography, level of income, natural
resource endowments, economic structure, human capital and skills, social structures,
economic policies, and institutions. Their land surface areas are 44% larger than China or 3.8
times the size of the European Union, and hold half of the world’s known oil reserves and its
natural gas (BP 2014). Therefore, the oil sector has provided the basis for economic and social
development throughout the region, not only for oil-producing economies but for resourcepoor Arab economies as well, through remittances, trade, capital and aid flows. The region has
also been linked to economic policy, with similar models of economic development adopted
by ACs since the 1950s and 1960s, based upon state-led planning with strong social policies
designed for redistribution and equity (Bibi and Nabli 2010).
Different themes have shaped the characteristics of socioeconomic reform after independence.
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the development model in ACs was based on strong governments,
central planning of economic and social priorities, and wide-scale policies for redistribution
and equity. During the 1970s-oil boom, ACs especially the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries launched ambitious programs of public spending on infrastructure and services.
Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s, this progress faced pressures for change because of the
significant role played by oil revenues. In the 1990s and 2000s, many ACs launched economic
reform programs prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
These reforms mainly were concerned with structural adjustment policies, macroeconomic
stabilisation and structural reforms (Abbott et al. 2010).
Despite implementing all these reforms, they did not significantly affect the standards of
living of Arab citizens. Indeed, over the last fifteen years or so, growth performance of the
Arab region as a whole has been disappointing. According to Makdisi et al. (2006), the
economic growth pattern is inextricably linked to several characteristics of most of the
economies in the region notably, their heavy dependence on oil, weak economic base, high
population growth and unemployment rates, low rates of returns on investment in physical and
human capital, low level of integration in the world economy, and underdevelopment of
market institutions.
A significant constraint to growth is the lack of adequate infrastructure, an exception being the
Gulf countries. Following the World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessments, almost half of
the private businesses in the region complain that infrastructure is moderate to a significant
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obstacle to conducting business. Telecommunications and transportation, two necessary
services, are also significantly underdeveloped (Nabli 2007).
Furthermore, across the region, the lack of improvement in labour markets and living
conditions are another critical constraint on growth. Unemployment is one of the primary
sources of economic failure in most Arab countries. According to the Arab Labour
Organization (ALO) in 2007, the overall average unemployment rate for the ACs was about
14.4 percent of the labour force compared to 6.3 percent for the world at large (Utz and Aubert
2013). A cross-country study of developing countries including Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and
Jordan found that the first three of these countries have significant gaps relative to other
developing countries with regard not only to youth employment but also the quantity and
quality of education and skills mismatches (EBRD 2015; Jelassi et al. 2015). Of the seven Arab
countries assessed in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, five scored
worst in the labour market efficiency category in 2014 – 15, and three of these countries
(Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia) have been in the bottom decile of rankings of labour market
efficiency for the previous three years (World Bank 2016b).
Owing to the nature of the educational system, there is a strong presence of large public sectors
which distort incentives, in addition to excessive regulations negatively affecting private sector
expansion. The countries in the region continue to fail to use human capital efficiently.
Pissarides and Véganzonès (2006), argued that education systems in the region are more
aligned to the needs of the public sector, with the result that acquired skills do not match those
required in growth-enhancing activities in the private sector. Excessive regulation of the private
sector and a highly controlled labour market, have further removed the incentives for
employers to recruit, train and retain productive workers.
Moreover, a report by UNDP (2011), which examined the sectoral economic growth and longterm structural transformation in the region, found that heavy sectoral weights of extractive
industries lead to dependence on global oil prices. The structure of production limits
employment generation for skilled and semi-skilled labour. Low-skilled services and informal
activities absorb the labour force and have adverse effects on aggregate productivity and living
standards. The slow emergence of manufacturing capacities distinguishes the economies of the
Arab region from other developing countries, such as those in Asia.
Economists in recent years have come to a broad consensus that economic performance is not
always warranted by economic characteristics alone, but it is often shaped by the political and
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institutional environment in which economic activities take place (Kaufmann and Kraay 2008).
Regarding the Arab region, besides the poor economic conditions, there are weak governance
and institutional framework. Regardless of the different approaches used by institutional and
commercial agencies, they all conclude that ACs are poor in all these indicators including the
governance aspects in general and especially in democracy (Kaufmann et al. 2010; Marshall et
al. 2012; PRS Group 2011).
According to the Freedom House (2015), the region as a whole had the worst civil liberties
scores of any region, and most of its countries classified as partly free or not free. Arab nations
are among the worst performers in estimates of global corruption perceptions index (CPI)
(Transparency International 2011). They also observed that corruption is the primary challenge
in the region, with three of the bottom ten countries CPIs in 2014 coming from the region.
High-level corruption is exemplified by the ruling elites who control both the polity and key
segments of the economy. They abuse formal and informal institutions to control the
accumulation and distribution of resources and jobs to extend their power and amass illicit
wealth. Corruption was indeed an instrument for the capture of the economy. Despite the
process of transition to a liberal economy as happened in Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt,
the elite’s power and hold over resources expanded during these periods of “economic
liberalisation”. For instance, privatisation and public procurement operations carefully
managed to ensure that close associates of the rulers would control these assets. This has led to
an entrenched rent-seeking system of crony capitalism (Kaufmann and Fellow 2011).
There is no doubt that these political and economic institutional conditions had reflected
directly on economic performance and business activities. Emara and Jhonsa (2011) and Nabli
(2007) have argued that the low efficiency of capital in the MENA region can be attributed to
the fact that most countries in the region provide an unfriendly business environment and
insufficient institutional support for private investment. Makdisi et al. (2006) have also
highlighted the importance of the quality of institutions in explaining the low productivity
performance of MENA countries in comparison with the rest of the world in general.
Furthermore, Aysan et al. (2007) addressed the issue of the low level of private investment in
the region, with the empirical results showing that governance plays a significant role in private
investment decisions. The same result exists in the case of "administrative quality" in the form
of control of corruption, bureaucratic quality, the investment-friendly profile of administration,
law and order, as well as for "political stability." The estimations also stress that structural
24
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reforms like financial development and human development affect private investment
decisions directly, through their positive effect on governance.
In the light of the above, the ACs regarding polity is characterised by a top-down, personalised,
highly concentrated, and non-contestable mode of governing. Economically, the region
exhibited highly skewed income and wealth accumulation as well as resource allocation, and
distribution of political power linked with a highly centralised power of the ruling elite. In
particular, under this politically and economically captured system, neither the middle nor the
poor class were beneficiaries.
Under this dark image of living conditions, a broad wave of protests spread throughout most
of the Arab region popularly referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’. The Arab street seemed to have
made clear that it is no longer willing to accept these development models and the control and
distribution of the region’s resources. A primary goal of the protesters everywhere from Tunisia
to Bahrain was easy to capture from major slogans of the demonstrators in the Arab world. The
first one was, "The people want to overthrow the regime" and the second “Bread, freedom and
social justice”. These slogans represented what Arab people have suffered from, especially
during the last two decades. They aim to create more participatory and representative political
systems, a fairer economic system, and independent judiciaries (Alimi et al. 2016).
Regarding the first slogan, Tunisians succeeded in overthrowing their president, and so did the
Egyptians, the Libyans, and the Yemenis (Hissouf 2014), while the second one which
underlines the interdependence of inclusive governance, economic and social inclusion, still
requires more time to achieve it. It needs more strategic thinking towards exploring alternative
solutions and a range of development policy options to help redress the underlying causes that
gave rise to the widespread popular grievances and discontent.
To further understand the origins of and find solutions to the Arab Spring, this paper aims to
investigate why Arab economies have failed to achieve sustained inclusive growth. In order to
address this question, the study evaluates the impact of socioeconomic reforms on economic
performance, through estimating an economic growth model for the Arab Region in
comparison to other regions in the world with an emphasis on the role of governance.
In other words, the research attempts to understand the possible explanations: whether the
growth performance of the region has been disappointing because ACs economies have lagged
behind in terms of reforms, or due to the reform programs themselves lacking key components
such as governance and quality of institutions?
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the second section is a brief overview of the
theoretical model, while section three presents the empirical model and estimation approach.
Section four presents the aggregated indicators of economic reforms, human capital, physical
infrastructure, and governance and summarises the progress of these indicators in the Arab
region. Section five discusses the estimated results of the growth model that includes the
different composite indicators, with the last section focusing on conclusions and policy
implications.

2. The Methodology
2.1 The Empirical Model
The setup of the empirical model is primarily driven by the Solow-Swan growth model with
the estimation approach following “Barro-type regression” (Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995). As
mentioned, the primary aim of the model is to measure the economic reform effort of the
countries by estimating a conditional convergence equation for economic growth. The
aggregated economic reform indicators are generated using principal component analysis
(PCA). This novel approach allows the computation and categorisation of environmental
variables identified by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) into six separate groups.
The first component is macroeconomic stability reform indicator (M) incorporating
exchange rate (M1), the deficit (M2), public debt (M3), inflation (M4), and unemployment
(M5). The second is external stability reform indicator (E) which contains current account
balance (E1), the ratio of external debt to exports (E2), total reserves in months of imports (E3),
and diversification index (E4). Thirdly, the component of structural and business reform (B)
consists of foreign direct investment (B1), domestic credit to the private sector (B2), and the
concentration index (B3). Fourthly, the component of human capital indicator (H), which
includes health expenditure (H1), school enrolment (H2), life expectancy (H3), and scientific
articles published (H4). The fifth component is physical infrastructure indicator (P),
consisting of fixed telephone subscriptions (P1), improved water source (P2), access to
electricity for population (P3), and improved sanitation facilities (P4). Lastly, the governance
indicator (G) is based on voice and accountability (G1), political stability (G2), government
effectiveness (G3), regulatory quality (G4), the rule of law (G5) and control of corruption (G6).
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In addition, to controlling for sample heterogeneity and consistent with the literature, other two
control variables are examined. These variables reflect differences in endowment levels of
natural and human resources, which can be at the origin of significant differences in the “natural
propensity” to grow. The evolving demographic situation is controlled for through the
incorporation of annual population growth rate (POPi,t). Given the significance of the natural
resource sector to many of the African countries; the ratio of oil rent to GDP (oili,t) variable
has also been included in the model. This hypothesis is supported by the figures, as shown by
the value of the Hausman test as presented in the next section (see Table 3).
Real GDP per capita growth is therefore empirically expressed as follows:
𝒍𝒏(𝒀𝒊,𝒕 ) = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝝋𝟏 𝒍𝒏(𝒀𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 ) + 𝜽𝟏 (𝑴𝒊,𝒕 ) + 𝜽𝟐 (𝑬𝒊,𝒕 ) + 𝜽𝟑 (𝑩𝒊,𝒕 ) + 𝜽𝟒 (𝑷𝒊,𝒕 ) +
𝜽𝟓 (𝑯𝒊,𝒕 ) + 𝜽𝟔 (𝑮𝒊,𝒕 ) + 𝜽𝟕 (𝒐𝒊𝒍𝒊,𝒕 ) + 𝜽𝟖 (𝑷𝑶𝑷𝒊,𝒕 ) + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕

(𝟏)

where, 𝒀𝒊,𝒕 represents the economic growth rate in country i at time t; ln (𝒀𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 ) is an N x 1
vector of logs of initial GDP; Mi,t. macroeconomic stability indicator; Ei,t, external stability
indicator; Bi,t, structural and business reform indicator; Pi,t, physical infrastructures indicator;
Hi,t, human capital indicator; Gi,t, governance indicator; POPi,t, population growth rate; oili,t,the
ratio of oil rent to GDP; α0 is the intercept, θ1 to θ8 are parameters for convergence and the
principle components, i,t denote country and time period respectively, and εi,t is the error term.
2.2 Description of the Data
The empirical model as in equation (1) presents ten explanatory variables; six of which are
principal components with 24 sub-variables and four control variables. The empirical analysis
examines the trends and directions of the indicators, as well as the correlations between them
and then, applies a panel data econometrics to estimate the economic growth functions for the
respective group of countries. The study draws upon multiple sources for annual time-series
data on a host of economic, social, political, and institutional indicators for 76 countries from
7 different regions based on the availability of data and representativeness of all continents. As
Figure 1 shows, amongst these countries, 17 are Arab countries (ARB), 6 are Central & South
Asian countries (CSA), 9 are East Asian countries (EAS), 25 are European countries (ECS),
10 are Latin America countries (LCN), 2 are North American (NAC), and 9 are 7 Sub-Saharan
Africa countries (SSF).
In addition following World Bank (2006), the study classified Arab countries into four
subgroups according to their natural-resource wealth, labour abundance and level of income.
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The first group is “resource-poor, labour-abundant (RPLA)” or emerging economies (Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza). Second, “resource-rich labourabundant (RRLA)” or transition economies (Algeria, Iraq, and Syria), and the third group
“resource-rich labour-importing (RRLI)” economies (the rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
Countries - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Libya). Finally, “lowIncome Countries (LICs)” (Sudan and Yemen)3.
Figure 1: The Distribution of Countries in the Study Sample

The data sources for the analysis include the following:
i.

World Development Indicators (WDI): provides data for infant mortality rate, health
expenditure, education school enrollment, public spending on education, government
expenditure on education, road network logistics performance index, telephone network
fixed telephone subscriptions and improved water source (World Bank 2015).

ii.

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) CountryData provides data for GDP, inflation,
deficit, exchange rate, unemployment, public debt, external debt, and current account
balance (EIU 2015).

iii.

The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) captures six key dimensions
of governance since 1996. These are voice and accountability, political stability and lack
of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and control
of corruption (World Bank 2014).

3

See Appendices 1, 2, and 3 for the list of countries.
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2.3 Estimation Approaches
Panel data methods are the preferred approaches for pooled cross-country and time series data
((Durlauf and Quah 1999) since panel data methods provide more information, more efficiency
and less multi-collinearity (Baltagi 2008; Baltagi and Kao 2000). Panel estimates provide
higher degrees of freedom, are more informative, and biases are substantially smaller than
cross-sectional estimates.
One of the most significant challenges faced in panel data estimation is how to deal with
heterogeneity characteristics in the dataset. Barbieri (2006) has however noted that the
development of heterogeneous panel unit root and panel cointegration tests have greatly
enhanced empirical analysis using panel data.
Therefore, the estimation approach involves three stages: Firstly, panel unit-root test is
estimated based on Levin -Lin-Chu (LLC) test (2002), Im et al. (2003), Fisher type tests
(Maddala and Wu 1999) and (Choi 2002) to ensure the variables are integrated of the same
order. Secondly, panel co-integration technique based on Pedroni (1999) and Kao (1999) is
applied to check whether there is a long-run co-integrating relationship among the variables.
The analysis is especially interested in the group statistics which take into account
heterogeneity. Thirdly, the estimation tests the relevance of unobservable individual effects
through Lagrange Multiplier and Hausman tests.

3. Empirical results
3.1 Descriptive Analysis of Aggregated Indicators of Economic Reforms, Human Capital,
Physical Infrastructure and Governance
ACs differ considerably among themselves, as well as with the rest of the world, especially
regarding economic reforms, physical infrastructure, human capital and governance. These
differences have been assessed using various indicators that have been aggregated using
principal component analysis. This method has been used to generate six aggregate indicators.4

4

As part of the empirical work, the study attempted, without success, to introduce into PCA the
cumulative privatization receipts and stock market index as a factor in the structural reforms. Other
interesting indicators had to be ignored because of limited and reliable data. This was the case with
public health and education expenditures, the density of road network, and net international liquidity in
terms of months of import cover, which could have reinforced the external stability index. Similarly,
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This section briefly presents a summary of the six composite indicators which were created to
support the empirical analysis in the rest of the paper.
3.1.1 Macroeconomic Stability Indicators (M)
Macroeconomic stability denotes precise factors that lead to a stable and robust environment
in which individuals and companies can reliably engage in transactions. In terms of
macroeconomic stability, the GDP needs to increase at a reasonable pace each year. Such
increases allow a country’s citizens to enjoy a stable or better standard of living.
Figure 2: Macroeconomic Instability Indicator by Regions (1995 – 2014)
A. Regions

B. Arab subgroups

Source: Authors’ own calculations

The reform of macroeconomic stability indicator estimated as an inverted indicator, therefore,
low and negative values represent an improvement in the reform, while large and positive
values indicate bad macroeconomic stability conditions. As shown in Figure 2, macroeconomic
stability gradually declines over 1995 – 2014 in Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America
regions, while North America, Eastern Asia, and Europe regions experienced high progress in
macroeconomic stability.
For Arab region, there were some progressive improvements during the period 2000 - 2010,
however, the macroeconomic stability collapse in 2011 following the civil wars and political
instability in the region. For the 4 subgroups of ACs, the analysis shows that LICs, RPLA and
RRLA, have not achieved the required macroeconomic reform, while RRLI experienced

the structural reform index could not benefit from information on mean tariff rates, or highest marginal
individual and corporate taxes.
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significant improvements. Remarkably, the indicator declined for all sub-Arab groups in the
last period (Figure 2B).

3.1.2 External Stability Indicators (E)
External stability is defined as a desirable situation where an economy is living within its
means, and able to pay its commitments in its international transactions, without the burden of
these overseas payments causing severe problems that could reduce living standards. External
stability can refer to the key components that keep nations economically secure in relation to
the rest of the world. Instability can increase uncertainty, discourage investment, impede
economic growth, and hurt living standards.
Figure 3: External Stability Indicator by Regions (1995 – 2014)
A.

Region

B. Arab subgroups

Source: Authors’ own calculations

Remarkably as in Figure 3, there are three main clusters can be distinguished in this regard:
The East Asia region has experienced very high progress in external stability with average 0.90.
The second cluster with mild stability in the Central Asia region, the Arab region, and transition
economies in East Europe with an average 0.11, which slightly higher than the world average
-0.04. The third cluster with highest rates of instability during the whole period for Sub-Saharan
Africa and Latin American regions with average -0.80 and -0.17 respectively. For Arabian
nations, all oil exporting countries except Iraq in (RRLI and RRLA) have robust external
stability mainly due to the oil boom between 2002 to mid-2008, which generated a large
volume of revenues more than doubled their average compared with the preceding five years.
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The abundant revenues were instrumental in boosting all foreign stability components
especially current account balance and international reserves
3.1.3 Business and Structural Reform (B)
A government's main objective for structural reforms is to promote competition, enhance the
services sector, move up the value chain in manufacturing, and achieve stronger integration at
the regional and international levels. Ambitious structural reforms can boost economic growth.
Structural and market reform is quantified based on a wide range of indicators that take into
consideration trade policies, the business environment, the quality and improvement of the
business environment.
Figure 4: Business and Structural Reform Indicator by Regions (1995 – 2014)
A. Region

B. Arab subgroups

Source: Authors’ own calculations

Although the structure and market reform indicators witnessed a gradual increase from 1995
until 2010, it remained steady from this point till 2014. This was a result of the fall in FDI to
the Arab region after the political uprisings, especially in the RPLA countries, Egypt and
Tunisia. In general, ACs seemed to perform relatively good compared to other developing
regions in the world both at the general level and the specific 4 group’s classification level.
3.1.4: Human Capital indicators (H)

According to Savvides and Stengos (2008), the human capital endowment can be a more
important determinant of its long-term economic success than virtually any other resource. This
resource must be invested in and leveraged efficiently for it to generate returns, for the
individuals involved as well as an economy as a whole. Recent empirical investigations of the
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contribution of human capital accumulation to economic growth have confirmed the need for
improving health and education of the general populace to ensure sustainable growth and
economic development. It is argued that the developing world has to prioritise this effort on an
urgent basis (Alvi and Ahmed 2014).
Figure 5: Human Capital Indicator by Regions (1995 – 2014)
A. Region

B. Arab subgroups

Source: Authors’ own calculations

Although the human capital indicator in the Arab region improved slightly throughout the
period, it can be considered as the third worst in the world after Africa and Central Asia (Figure
5). It is obvious that large gaps still exist between ACs and the developed world in terms of
human capital. Analysing the infant mortality and school enrolment indicators showed
remarkable good performance starting from 2010 for all Arab sub-groups except RRLA (due
to the civil wars), this means there is potential for significant improvements in health and
education in the region.
3.1.5 Physical Infrastructure Indicators
Physical infrastructure refers to the basic physical structures required for an economy to
function and survive, such as electricity generation, transportation, telecommunication, and
water and sanitation. The impact of infrastructure on long-run economic growth has been
studied extensively. The underlying theoretical framework of the impact of public capital on
economic growth was developed first by Arrow and Kurz (1970). Based on this framework,
the endogenous growth literature shows that an increase in the stock of public capital can raise
the steady-state growth rate of output per capita, with permanent growth effects (Barro 1990,
1992).
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A majority of the literature finds a positive impact on the relationship between infrastructure
and economic output (Loayza and Odawara 2010). The complementarities between physical
infrastructure and physical and human capital lead to higher productivity and increase the
incentive to invest (Aschauer 1989; Calderón and Servén 2004; Seethepalli et al. 2008).
Figure 6: Physical Infrastructure Indicator by Region (1995 – 2014)
A. Region

B. Arab subgroups

Source: Authors’ own calculations

As shown in Figure 6, despite limited progress throughout the period, ACs status in
infrastructures has remained insufficient. Access to healthy water has slightly improved, but
about 50% of the low-income countries population in the Arab world still face difficulties in
accessing improved water. Closing the gap with more advanced developing countries
constitutes a significant challenge for ACs.
3.1.6 Governance and Institutions Indicator
In recent decades, a surge of interest in governance has been seen as a means to promote
economic development. Governance matters have been an integral part of societies since the
dawn of civilisation, and especially so concerning what values, ethics and rules of conduct and
justice should be upheld, how societies should be organised, and who should hold power and
authority.
Economists currently have dedicated increasing attention to the impacts of political institutions
and issues of governance in the process of economic development. The burgeoning literature
on the topic has indicated a broad consensus in that economic performance is not always
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warranted by economic characteristics alone, but it is often shaped by the political and
institutional environment in which economic activities take place (Kaufmann and Kraay 2008).
Additionally, in their analysis of some OECD countries during the period 1980 to 2000, Adam
et al. (2007) prove that the quality of governance is more essential than the socioeconomic
environment in affecting government spending efficiency. Furthermore, the findings of these
studies show that states that are efficient in their government spending are characterised by
citizen-friendly regulatory environments and strong transparency, regulatory practices, costeffectiveness, and public spending directly associated with policy purposes.
Figure 7: Governance and Institutions Indicator by Regions (1995 – 2014)
A. Region

B. Arab subgroups

Source: Authors’ own calculations

Figure 8: Governance and Institutions Indicator - Means
A. World Regions and Arab subgroups

B. Arab subgroups and Arab countries

Source: Authors’ calculations
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Following from Figure 7 and 8, North America, Europe and East Asia rank very highly
regarding the quality of governance. The Arab region is not only below the global average and
the third worst region behind Africa and Central Asia, but also the only region with a gradual
decrease in the governance indicator. On average, overall governance in the ACs is low, and
evidence shows that there have been virtually no good governance performers in the region.
3.1.7 GDP per capita growth
Despite the noticeable progress in various areas of reform, ACs growth performance has shown
disappointing results. Almost all ACs are growing slowly, but for different reasons. The Arab
region has the worst economic growth in terms of the progress of GDP per capita. The regional
GDP growth stayed at around 2 percent from 1995 to 2010 (Figure 9 and 10), which was lower
than the rest of the world regions.
Although some ACs called Arab reformers launched economic reform programs prescribed
by the IMF and the World Bank such as all countries in (RPLA) group, it can be seen that
nothing appears exceptional about the performance of these countries. Their GDP growth rates
are about the same as the others. These reformers countries’ simple average GDP and per capita
income growth rates consistently equal the growth rates of the entire region. This observation
reinforces the argument that the growth experienced in the region is coming from elsewhere.
Specifically, it comes from oil exports and oil revenues.
Following the Arab Spring revolutions in 2011, economic growth tumbled and turned negative;
an already poor development suffered yet another setback. However, ACs before the transitions
in 2011, they were lagging behind other emerging market and developing countries, and there
was a perceived lack of competition in domestic markets.
Figure 9: GDP per Capita Growth Rates (%) by regions (1995 – 2015)
A. Region

B. Arab subgroups

Source: Authors’ own calculations
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Figure 10: Percentage GDP per Capita Growth plot by time and by regions

Source: Authors’ own calculations

3.2 The Effect of New Aggregate Indicators on Economic Growth
As discussed in the methodology section, the estimation approach follows four main steps:
panel unit-root tests, panel cointegration tests, assessment of the significant of unobservable
individual effects tests, and empirical estimations of the model as presented in equations (1).
3.2.1 Panel Unit Root Tests:
Prior to testing the existence of a long-run cointegrating equilibrium among the variables, the
integration properties of each panel have to be examined, since an incorrect transformation of
the data may lead to spurious results.
Table 1: Panel Unit Root Tests for Variables in Level (Intercept is included)
Tests
Variables
Ly
M
E
B
H
P
G

Fisher

Levin, Lin &
Chu (LLC)

Im, Pesaran and Shin
(IPS)

ADF

PP

-16.64600
(0.000)
-3.73479
(0.001)
-7.77880
(0.000)
-7.33402
(0.0000)
-1.695
(0.0450)
-8.28406
(0.0000)
-8.5056
(0.0000)

-15.7851
(0.000)
-2.66146
(0.0039)
-3.19758
(0.007)
0.32819
(0.6286)
3.70912
(0.9999)
1.10117
(0. 8646)
-3.526
(0. 0002)

543.333
(0.000)
192.463
(0.0031)
187.146
(0.002)
143.240
(0.5022)
116.428
(0.9086)
225.629
(0.000)
240.525
(0.0000)

901.186
(0.000)
202.142
(0.0007)
225.811
(0.000)
147.889
(0.3950)
138.574
(0.4703)
504.369
(0.000)
253.355
(0.000)

Source: Authors’ own calculations using EViews and STATA.
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Note: Values in parentheses refer to the probability of the test statistics. The null hypothesis of Levin,
Lin & Chu t-test assumes common unit root process, while the others assume individual unit root
process.

The results of panel unit root tests in Table 1 are based on four-panel unit root tests for all
variables in levels and first differences namely, LLC, IPS, Fisher (ADF) and Fisher
(PP)(Breitung and Pesaran 2005; Gengenbach et al. 2006; Im et al. 2003). Apart from some
limited exceptions, panel unit root test statistics significantly confirm that all the series have
not a panel unit root in level, except for business reform (B) series, and human capital (H)
series are stationary variables in first difference, I (1) variables. First differencing can remove
non-stationarity as it appears from these two variables. Hence, the co-integration tests can be
examined with intercept only to avoid the potential stationarity of the dependent variable with
the trend.
3.2.2 Panel Co-Integration Tests
Two different tests of cointegration are performed to explore the co-movement among the
variables in the model: the Kao and Pedroni tests of cointegration, taking into consideration
the results of the panel unit root tests. Three tests of Pedroni (panel v, panel rho, and group rho)
indicate that there is no co-integration among economic growth and its important determinants.
In contrast, both Kao test and four other tests of Pedroni, including panel PP, group PP, panel
ADF, and group ADF reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% level of
significance as illustrated in Table 2.
Table 2: Results of Panel Co-integration Tests for All Countries
Pedroni Test

Cointegration
Tests

Kao Test

Test Statistic

ADF

Panel v

Panel
rho

Panel
PP

Panel
ADF

Group
rho-

Group
PP-

Group
ADF-

Intercept

3.09777
(0.010)

-3.2097
(0.9993)

5.25878
(1.000)

5.0367
(0.000)

2.11037
(0.0026)

7.24033
(1.000)

-9.1885
(0.000)

1.82218
(0.008)

H1: Common AR Coefficients
(within dimension)

H1: Individual AR Coefficients
(between dimension)

Source: Authors’ own calculations using EViews.
Note: P-values are given in parentheses. MAIC is used to determine the optimal number of lags to be
included in the second stage regression.
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According to the Monte Carlo simulation of Pedroni (Arellano and Bond 1991), the panel ADF
and PP, as well as the group ADF and PP, are the most appropriate tests statistics for this model
since they are working correctly in the case of the middle sample size as illustrated before.
Therefore, we can regard the estimation model as being panel co-integrated.

3.2.3 Panel Estimated Results
In this section, the analysis run pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects estimations; to
check the robustness of the results. Table 3 contains results of static panel data models from
estimating the baseline growth model formalised in equation (1) for the whole sample and ACs
samples.
Based on the results in Tables 3, the overall F-statistics are significant in all panel data models,
and therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected that the explanatory variables do not
explain (taken as a whole) changes in the dependent variable. Hence the determinants selected
in this study can be considered to sufficiently explain changes in the real per capita GDP
growth.
Table 3: Estimated Panel Data Models for the Whole Sample
Dependent Variable: The Growth rate of GDP per capita

lYY
M
E
B
H
P
G
T
Oil
pop
_cons
F test
R-squared
chi2

Coef.
-0.36*
-0.31*
-0.11*
0.16
-0.01
0.31*
-0.08
-0.001
-0.005
-0.04
4.37*

OLS
Std. Err.
0.12
0.10
0.05
0.20
0.21
0.10
0.06
0.01
0.003
0.03
1.04
0.0000
0.1096

Fixed Effects
Coef.
Std. Err.
-1.02*
0.34
-0.45*
0.21
-0.18**
0.09
0.11
0.21
-0.02
0.21
1.05*
0.36
0.21
0.21
-0.004
0.01
-0.002
0.01
-0.11*
0.05
10.55
3.05
0.00000
0.0717

LM test, chi2
Hausman, chi2

Random Effects
Coef.
Std. Err.
-0.36*
0.12
-0.31*
0.10
-0.11*
0.05
0.16
0.20
-0.01
0.21
0.31*
0.10
-0.08
0.06
-0.001
0.005
-0.005
0.003
-0.04
0.03
4.37
1.04
0.0943
0.0000
0.76

11.82

Source: Authors’ own calculations
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In Table 3, there is evidence of potential unobserved heterogeneity across countries owing to
the insignificance of the estimated chi2 of the Lagrange Multiplier. Moreover, the OLS
estimated standard errors are only valid when the errors are homoscedastic and not correlated
(within individual countries) over time. As shown in Appendix 4 Table 4.1, it is clear that there
is a weak correlation over time, which is very consistent with this result, indicating that there
is probably no observed individual heterogeneity. Furthermore, the estimated robust standard
errors are approximately similar to the standard OLS ones (see Appendix 4, Table 4.2) (Mátyás
and Sevestre 2006). Therefore, the pooled OLS regression will be the most appropriate results
for the whole sample.
The results in Table 4 show that the relationship between GDP per capita growth rates and its
determinants is consistent with the theory. First, regarding the estimated coefficient of GDP
per capita in the previous period, all samples are significant with negative signs except the oilrich economies in the sixth and seventh samples (RRLA & RRLI). Consistently with the
conditional convergence concept introduced by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), the
convergence in the study model is conditional; it predicts higher growth in response to lower
starting GDP per person only if the other explanatory variables (some of which are highly
correlated with GDP per person) are held constant. For instance, in the world sample the
estimated coefficient is −0.36 (s.e.=0.12), so the magnitude of the estimated coefficient implies
that convergence occurs at the rate of about 36 percent per year. In other words, a one-standarddeviation decline in the log of per capita GDP would raise the growth rate on impact by 0.36.
This effect is very large in comparison with the other effects, that is, conditional convergence
can have important influences on growth rates.
As a result of the positive relationship between stabilisation and growth, the signs of the
coefficients as expected are all negative except for sample 6(RRLA). The strength of
significant and negative stability coefficients supports the argument that the economy has the
desired degree of macroeconomic stability that leads to the confidence of investors, incentives
for the most productive destination of the inputs, and the accumulation of inputs feasible and
profitable at reasonable rates of risks. In contrast, an economy marked by macroeconomic
instability will present an excessive degree of uncertainty, which in turn will deter agents from
investing or will cause them to make wrong decisions regarding the allocation of resources to
alternative projects.
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Table 4: Estimated Panel Data Models for the Study Samples of Countries
Dependent Variable: The Growth Rate of GDP per capita
Independent
variables

(1)
World Sample
(Arab & Non-Arab)

Arab Samples (Whole Arab Countries and Arab sub-groups)

(2)
Non- Arab Sample

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Whole Arab Sample

LICS Sample

RPLA Sample

RRLA Sample

RRLI Sample

Coef.

Std. Err.

Coef.

Std. Err.

Coef.

Std. Err.

Coef.

Std. Err.

Coef.

Std. Err.

Coef.

Std. Err.

Coef.

Std. Err.

lyy

-0.36*

0.12

-0.62*

0.16

-0.05*

0.20

-27.32*

24.21

-1.79*

0.84

0.37*

3.80

1.81*

2.64

M

-0.31*

0.10

-0.43*

0.13

-0.25*

0.21

0.79*

2.21

-0.29*

0.54

0.92*

1.38

-0.44*

0.63

E

-0.11*

0.05

-0.22*

0.06

0.02

0.09

-1.27*

1.35

-0.06*

0.36

-0.20*

0.76

-0.38*

0.45

B

0.16

0.20

0.19

0.20

0.11

0.77

-5.86

4.38

-0.58

1.06

-1.62

3.54

1.04

2.15

H

-0.01

0.21

1.17*

0.55

-0.15*

0.24

2.33

6.05

-1.37

1.53

-0.42

4.66

-0.24*

0.32

P

0.31*

0.10

0.46

0.14

0.25

0.21

5.14

7.63

0.90

0.59

-2.86

11.30

-1.27

2.27

G

-0.08

0.06

0.02*

0.07

-0.21*

0.18

-1.18*

1.96

-0.93*

0.58

-0.21

2.81

-1.07*

1.05

T

-0.001

0.01

-0.005

0.006

0.02

0.03

0.09*

0.03

-0.01**

0.05

0.86*

0.90

-0.29*

0.18

Oil

-0.005

0.003

0.0002*

0.003

-0.004*

0.01

0.10

0.14

-0.04

0.02

-0.07*

0.13

-0.07*

0.04

pop

-0.04

0.03

-0.10*

0.08

-0.04*

0.04

-7.84*

6.15

-0.13

0.21

-1.52*

3.14

-0.13*

0.08

_cons

4.37*

1.04

6.81

1.38

1.34

1.71

216.59

169.60

15.81

6.82

3.12

29.32

-11.45

25.40

F test

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

R2-adj.

0.1096

0.2816

0.2836

0.9284

0.5050

0.5539

0.2835

N. Countries

76

59

17

2

5

3

7

*Denote significant at 5% level and **Denote significant at 10% level

Concerning the structural reforms (B) and physical infrastructure (P) variables, the
coefficients of these factors are insignificant for all samples except where physical
infrastructure is strongly significant and positive for the world sample. This could be because
the nature of these indicators is associated with other indicators to improve the economic
growth such as macroeconomic stability or external stability, by generating additional indirect
benefits in the sense that services constitute an important intermediate input to downstream
sectors such as manufacturing. According to Canton et al. (2014), reforms to labour markets
that increase labour utilisation and boost output potential is vital to reducing structural
unemployment, improving activity and employment rates, and boosting potential growth and
welfare. On the other hand, another study by Mussa (1987) and Williamson (1994) suggested
that the efficiency of structural reforms depends on success in stabilising the economy. In other
words, reforming the economy materialises into growth if applied in a stable macroeconomic
environment. In an increasingly volatile environment, a high level of structural reforms
increases the disruptive effect of macroeconomic instability. This means that structural reforms
should take place at least at the same time as macroeconomic reforms, if not after.
However, the most striking result to emerge from the Table 4 is that the coefficients of
human capital (H) and governance (G) indicators are statistically significant and positive for
the non-Arab sample, they are statistically significant and negative for the Arab sample. This
reflects the poor quality of human resources and governance in ACs and its effect on production
output. This result is consistent with relative studies, for instance, regarding the bad condition
of human capital and according to the last report from UNESCO (2014): the average adult
literacy rate in the region only reached 72.9% in 2012. In addition, as Huebler and Lu (2015)
prove that the evidence demonstrates that school systems in the region are generally of low
quality. Necessary skills are not learned; most international standardised tests prove that the
region is still below the expected level.
Regarding the governance variable, it is significant but with a negative affect not only for Arab
sample, but also for all sub-Arab groups, which is consistent with Ahmad and Marwan (2012);
Hall et al. (2010); Jalilian et al. (2007); Nabli (2007)who confirms that institutional quality in
ACs is very poor and faces many problems. That probably again explains the reasons for ‘Arab
Spring’ in the region.
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The coefficients of human capital, physical infrastructure and governance are complementary
in understanding why the growth performance of the Arab region has been disappointing. Mo
(2001) emphasises this relationship by linking corruption to low growth through reduced
human and physical capital. He proves that, for private investors, corruption increases
investment and operation costs, as well as uncertainties about the timing and effects of the
application of government regulations. Corruption also raises the investment and operational
costs of public enterprises, which are detrimental to private investment through inadequate and
low-quality infrastructures (Tanzi and Davoodi 1998). The same conclusions have been
reached for the effects of bureaucratic quality on the economic activity(Rauch and Evans 2000).
The last notable point in Table 4 is that, although ACs holds near to half of the global oil
reserves, a quarter of natural gas reserves, and control almost a third of oil production, the
coefficient of percentage of fuel exports to manufactured exports (O) is statistically significant
with negative sign, in contrast to the non-Arab sample. This kind of relationship could explain
the “resource curse” phenomena in the Arab region. That mean a negative growth and poor
development outcomes are related to natural resources. The key reason for the slow growth is
that ACs have failed to improve the performance of non-oil sectors (Selim and Zaki 2016).
Large petroleum industry and high dependence on oil exports create unemployment and major
social disparities and inequalities that fuel economic grievances leading to protest, insurgency,
and civil war (Costello et al. 2015).

4. Conclusions and Policy Implications
The main argument of this paper is there was a significant economic element to the Arab
Spring, which relies mainly on the Arab economies failure to achieve sustained inclusive
growth. Although ACs had implemented several economic and political reforms, it did not
significantly affect the standards of living for Arab citizens. For instance, economically, the
Arab region has the worst economic growth of GDP per capita. The regional GDP growth stays
lower than the rest of the world regions. Also, the region exhibited highly skewed income and
wealth accumulation as well as resource allocation. Politically, Arab nations are among the
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worst performers in estimates of global corruption perceptions index. Consequently, in 2011 a
wave of protests spread throughout most of the Arab region for economic and political rights.
To capture the origins of that situation, the study evaluated the impact of socioeconomic
reforms on economic performance, by estimating an economic growth model for the Arab
Region. The main aim is to understand the possible explanations for the Arab Spring: whether
the growth performance of the region has been disappointing because ACs economies have
lagged regarding reforms, or due to the reform programs themselves missing key components
such as governance and quality of institutions.
The research model investigated most of the components of reform programs by generating
aggregated reform indicators using principal component analysis. This method allows
computing several variables into six separate groups to present the importance of economic
reforms, human capital, physical infrastructure and governance to improve the growth
prospects of the economies. These factors have been shown to have a powerful impact on
growth. They have greatly contributed to the growth process in the study samples.
The empirical results presented that, the Arab World’s economic performance in the past 20
years has been below its potential. In addition, the ACs as a whole failed to generate high and
sustained growth, did not reap the benefits of globalisation and the world economic integration,
and were unsuccessful in dealing with persistently high unemployment rates. Breaking down
Arab GDP growth into growth rate for country groups will disclose that only oil exporters show
significant improvement (RRLI). Meanwhile, growth rates for other country groups have
partially enhanced or remained flat-except in some countries in RPLA during the period 20052010, such as Tunisia and Egypt.
The analysis shows, in general, economic stabilisation contributed positively to Arab region’s
development except during high macroeconomic volatility in some years, especially after
2010—which lead to disruptive growth. In addition, although most ACs implemented better
macroeconomic policies, consolidating macroeconomic stability is still a priority for the
success of structural reforms, as well as for successful competition with more successful
developing countries. These results stress the importance of macroeconomic reforms for the
growth prospects and the reform processes of the ACs. Macroeconomic stability remains
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important for the government to address and reforming the economy should not be undertaken
before stabilising.
As for external stability, it has been identified as another factor affecting growth performances
in ACs. The external instability of the 1990s strongly contributed to the economic turmoil of
the period. In the 2000s, the renegotiation of the external debt assisted to improve the growth
development in the region. The gap regarding external debt and the significant scope for debt
reduction indicate, however, it still represents a potentially significant source of growth for the
future.
The region is also concerned with achieving progress in structural reforms, which have always
lagged behind faster-growing countries regarding forging investment, trade openness, and
financial development. In the 1990s, the slow pace of these reforms limited the benefits of
macroeconomic stabilisation. In fact, as illustrated by econometric results, attracting FDI,
improving trade openness, and financial development would strongly contribute to the
economic growth of ACs, in addition to facilitating the integration of the region into the world
economy. However, more efforts are still needed to promote faster growth; governments should
focus on simplifying the complex procedures for doing business and improving infrastructure.
Financial sector reform, especially of state-owned banks, is also crucial to allocate resources
to their most productive use and finance diversification. Many of these countries may have to
readjust their overvalued exchange rates, which are undermining export competitiveness.
Moreover, heightened uncertainty brought about by the introduction of reforms further deters
the private sector from investing in an economic activity that does not yield immediate shortterm return.
Furthermore, the empirical model confirms that the ACs resource rents have a negative effect
on economic growth as well as governance. These results propose that the resource curse in the
Arab world is primarily an “institutional curse”, even though it has several macroeconomic
manifestations. The political conditions affect economics through how resource rents are
collected, allocated and used. Explanations for the failure of the governments of various Arab
states to provide the kind of sound governance for their populations that can deliver strong
economic progress and meaningful upward mobility have tended to fall into one of three
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categories: firstly, the implementation of misguided economic policies that provide
government officials with an excessive amount of authority over the allocation of national
resources; secondly , the presence of rampant corruption and cronyism throughout the organs
of the state; and lastly the lack of accountability caused by a dearth of democracy and political
freedoms.
The effects of this misgovernance were so bad for all ACs in particular with no exceptions. For
economies with little natural resource income relative to the size of their population (LICs and
RPLA), the role of state control of major economic activities has been a key reason as to why
resource-poor Arab nations have failed to keep pace with countries possessing more marketoriented economic policies. On the other hand, weak governance in the abundant natural
resource countries (RRLA and RRLI) have predated resource discovery and have had adverse
implications for macroeconomic management. At the same time, natural resources have
consolidated the weak institutional set-up. Over time, the interaction between these two factors
became intertwined and prevented ACS from embarking on a sustainable development path.
Therefore, the analysis suggests that for ACs in general and resource-rich Arab countries
(RRLI) to avoid the oil curse and achieve sustained growth and development, they must
introduce effective political reforms. It is hoped that stronger political institutions will trigger
reform in macroeconomic stability in general and in particular the structural reform that would
improve the management of natural resources, achieve more savings, and implement more
efficient private sector and public spending programs. The main challenge of these reforms is
not only to make diversification in their economies but also to reorient their economies toward
greater private-sector employment of nationals.
Regarding the human capital impact, it is critical that ACs reduce inequality of opportunity and
foster more inclusive growth. Working-age population growth in the region is higher than in
all other developing regions except Sub-Saharan Africa, and according to World Bank (2016a),
this rate will stay the same over the next decade. From this demographic perspective, it is
imperative that labour market and other policy adjustments begin as soon as possible, and that
there be a special emphasis on addressing shortcomings affecting youth.
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Concerning labour market policies, policymakers in the region should move forward to remove
supply-side restrictions, such as improving the quality of and implementing programs to better
match labour force skills with those demanded by job markets. These efforts will need to be
combined with the removal of constraints to competition and impediments to equality of
opportunity among businesses.
To conclude, according to the results of this study, reform is simultaneously political, social
and economic. It is thus because real development is not only a question of employment,
inflation and GDP growth. It also includes an incentive (profit), property rights (means of
governance), resource allocation, and wealth distribution. The economic policy design that
addresses these issues cannot ignore their political and social contexts and implications.
Ignoring social implications will turn those who stand to reap the most benefits from reform
into the enemies of reform. Therefore, there is a complementary relationship between
socioeconomic reform and institutions. Political and economic reform should go together.
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Appendices
Appendix. 1: List of Countries Included in the Analysis
Arab
Countries
(ARB)
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt, Arab
Rep.
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Syrian Arab
Republic
Tunisia
United Arab
Emirates
Yemen, Rep.

Central &
South Asia
(CSA)
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
India
Iran, Islamic
Rep.
Kazakhstan
Russian
Federation

East Asia
(EAS)

Europe
(ECS)

Australia
China
Hong Kong
SAR, China
Indonesia
Korea, Rep.
Malaysia
New
Zealand
Singapore
Thailand

Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech
Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovak
Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Turkey
United
Kingdom

Latin
America
(LCN)
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Ecuador
México
Perú
Venezuela,
RB

North
America
(NAC)
Canada
United
States

Appendix. 2: List of the Regions Included in the Analysis, 1995 - 2014
Region ode
ARB
CSA
EAS
ECS
LCN
NAC
SSF
Total

No. of
Countries
17
6
9
25
10
2
7
76

No. of Observations
(1995 – 2014)
340
120
180
500
200
40
140
1,520
52

SubSaharan
Africa
(SSF)
Angola
Kenya
Namibia
Nigeria
South Africa
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Appendix 3: List of the Arab Sub-groups Included in the Analysis, 1995 – 2014
Arab Sub-groups

Names of Countries

Low-income Countries
(LICs)
Resource-poor,
Labour-abundant
(RPLA)
Resource-rich,
Labour-abundant
RRLA

Resource-rich,
Labour-importing
RRLI

No. of
Observations

1. Sudan
2. Yemen, Rep.
3. Egypt, Arab Rep.
4. Jordan
5. Lebanon
6. Morocco
7. Tunisia
8. Algeria
9. Iraq
10. Syrian Arab Republic
11. Bahrain
12. Kuwait
13. Libya
14. Oman
15. Qatar
16. Saudi Arabia
17. United Arab Emirates

Total

40

100

60

140

340

Appendix 4.1: The Correlation Coefficients of the OLS Residuals Over Time
uols

uols_1

uols_2

uols_3

uols_4

uols
1
L1.
0.1771
1
L2.
0.0116 0.1539
1
L3. -0.0623 0.0707 0.2719
1
L4. -0.0062 -0.0608 0.2656 0.3486

1

Appendix 4.2: The Robust of Standard Errors
ly1
lyy1
M
E
B
H
P
G
T
Oil
pop
_cons

Coef.
-0.33
-0.38
-0.12
0.06
-0.28
0.50
-0.10
0.01
-0.01
-0.06
4.04

Robust Std. Err.
0.10
0.11
0.05
0.08
0.09
0.14
0.05
0.01
0.00
0.05
0.82

t
-3.42
-3.45
-2.24
0.8
-3.16
3.67
-1.85
1.06
-2.43
-1.24
4.9

P>t
0.001
0.001
0.03
0.428
0.003
0.001
0.071
0.294
0.019
0.222
0
53

[95% Conf. Interval]
-0.52
-0.14
-0.60
-0.16
-0.22
-0.01
-0.10
0.22
-0.45
-0.10
0.22
0.77
-0.21
0.01
-0.01
0.02
-0.01
0.00
-0.15
0.04
2.38
5.69

